I am still thinking about the comments made by Portland city Council members at a recent City Club of Portland Friday Forum.
Sam Adams seemed to have the most mature presentation of metrics for his bureaus. Among other things, he seems to know what a metric is.
Dan Saltzman gave answers that were more activity or process based.
Randy Leonard, with whom I'm developing a deep love-scorn relationship, was the most intuitive and immature -- he will judge the performance of his bureau's by what people tell him at cocktail parties. The problem will be, getting him to attend the correct parties so that he can get well-rounded input and not the typical lefty liberal echo chamber.
On the one hand, Management by Walking Around can be very effective. On the other hand, must be augmented by meaningful metrics.
Tuesday, August 09, 2005
Sunday, August 07, 2005
Benchmarking your Industry
Here's one way to benchmark yourself: get a third party to assemble an anonymous survey of your industry.
The Utility of Vengeance
I think this explains my campaign against Mary Gallegos in 2004.
SCIENCE JOURNAL
By SHARON BEGLEY
Vengeance Is Mine,
Sayeth the Lord --
But Scientists Differ
WSJ, October 15, 2004; Page B1
To a cynic, the good people of Florida who helped out their worse-off neighbors after last month's hurricanes were actually acting selfishly.
According to a leading theory of human behavior, they were merely polishing their reputations and collecting IOUs in case they themselves needed help one day. Altruism had nothing to do with it.
But this jaded view of human behavior hits a brick wall every time a Good Samaritan helps a stranger, waving off questions about his identity.
Such pure altruism has long defied scientific logic and puzzled evolutionary biologists, who seek explanations for how behaviors arose and persist. From a purely rational, cold-hearted, survival-of-the-fittest perspective, it makes no sense to do a good deed if it costs you time, money or your own safety, unless it enhances your reputation or helps a close relative survive and prosper. (In evolutionary theory, helping relatives is just as good as helping yourself, and the only reason that other animals do good deeds.)
"Human altruism is unique in the animal world," says Ernst Fehr, a behavioral economist at the University of Zurich in Switzerland. "None of our current theories can explain altruism when there is anonymity and therefore no chance of reciprocity or enhancing your reputation."
But scientists think they have discovered a plausible explanation. There are just enough people in society who are willing to punish anyone who does not contribute to the common good, even when it costs them to do so. Scientists call it "altruistic punishment." But you can think of it as righteous vengeance.
To probe the prevalence of and motivation for keeping others in line even at a cost to themselves, behavioral economists have volunteers play a little game. Each player starts with $20, and each decides, without knowing the others' moves, how much to contribute to a common kitty. The kitty will be doubled and distributed among all four regardless of what -- or even whether -- each contributes. If everyone kicks in $20, for instance, the resulting $80 will be doubled to $160 and split four ways, $40 each. These cooperators will have doubled their stake.
But if only three players kick in $20 each, then the $120 distributed among all four players will give everyone $30. Those who contributed their entire $20 will be a little better off, but the person who kicked in nothing will make out best of all, keeping her $20 and getting $30 from the kitty.
The temptation to freeload while others contribute to the common good is therefore strong. But if everyone followed this selfish strategy, no one would contribute anything and no one would improve on their $20 stake. In experiments, people seem to grasp this, and contribute about half their stake. But after a while, people decrease their contribution, learning that selfishness pays.
Prof. Fehr and his colleagues then introduced a twist: They let players exact punishment. At the end of each round, if Player A thinks Player B has been freeloading, A can fine B, but only at a cost. If A wishes to fine B $1, say, A must also pay 30 cents to the person running the game.
From a purely selfish and even logical point of view, A would be an idiot to do this. A loses money and gains nothing tangible in return. Yet most players are eager to exact punishment anyway. In fact, they exact revenge even when they have no chance of reaping any rewards personally: Players are quite willing to engage in such altruistic punishment even if the game is arranged so that A never again plays in the same group as B and therefore has no chance of benefiting from more public-spirited behavior by a chastened B.
"The punishment pattern does not change," says Prof. Fehr. "It's astonishing. Even though B makes a larger public contribution in later rounds with other players, A never benefits from imposing the fine. People do not act simply to maximize their economic self-interest. They are ruled not only by cold economic logic but by emotion and a sense of fair play."
Lucky thing, too. Groups that include a number of altruistic punishers are better able to survive disasters such as war and famine. As a result, this strategy spreads, anthropologist Robert Boyd of the University of California, Los Angeles, reported in a paper earlier this year.
"Even when naturally selfish individuals are a majority, the presence of people willing to punish freeloaders can enforce social cooperation in much larger groups," says Prof. Fehr. Would-be freeloaders get the message that, if they fail to contribute to the common good, someone out there may nail them for it.
It isn't clear why some people are prone to playing avenging angel, but altruistic punishment seems to have deep neurological roots. A brain-imaging study led by Prof. Fehr this past summer found that people who have the highest activity in the cortex's reward circuit, which fires on all cylinders when we achieve something enjoyable, are also the most likely to punish freeloaders even at a high cost to themselves. Apparently, the economic cost is more than offset by the psychological reward: It feels good.
The Lord may sayeth that vengeance is His, but when it comes to keeping our fellow members of society in line, gleeful vengeance seems to be civilization's glue. [/quote]
SCIENCE JOURNAL
By SHARON BEGLEY
Vengeance Is Mine,
Sayeth the Lord --
But Scientists Differ
WSJ, October 15, 2004; Page B1
To a cynic, the good people of Florida who helped out their worse-off neighbors after last month's hurricanes were actually acting selfishly.
According to a leading theory of human behavior, they were merely polishing their reputations and collecting IOUs in case they themselves needed help one day. Altruism had nothing to do with it.
But this jaded view of human behavior hits a brick wall every time a Good Samaritan helps a stranger, waving off questions about his identity.
Such pure altruism has long defied scientific logic and puzzled evolutionary biologists, who seek explanations for how behaviors arose and persist. From a purely rational, cold-hearted, survival-of-the-fittest perspective, it makes no sense to do a good deed if it costs you time, money or your own safety, unless it enhances your reputation or helps a close relative survive and prosper. (In evolutionary theory, helping relatives is just as good as helping yourself, and the only reason that other animals do good deeds.)
"Human altruism is unique in the animal world," says Ernst Fehr, a behavioral economist at the University of Zurich in Switzerland. "None of our current theories can explain altruism when there is anonymity and therefore no chance of reciprocity or enhancing your reputation."
But scientists think they have discovered a plausible explanation. There are just enough people in society who are willing to punish anyone who does not contribute to the common good, even when it costs them to do so. Scientists call it "altruistic punishment." But you can think of it as righteous vengeance.
To probe the prevalence of and motivation for keeping others in line even at a cost to themselves, behavioral economists have volunteers play a little game. Each player starts with $20, and each decides, without knowing the others' moves, how much to contribute to a common kitty. The kitty will be doubled and distributed among all four regardless of what -- or even whether -- each contributes. If everyone kicks in $20, for instance, the resulting $80 will be doubled to $160 and split four ways, $40 each. These cooperators will have doubled their stake.
But if only three players kick in $20 each, then the $120 distributed among all four players will give everyone $30. Those who contributed their entire $20 will be a little better off, but the person who kicked in nothing will make out best of all, keeping her $20 and getting $30 from the kitty.
The temptation to freeload while others contribute to the common good is therefore strong. But if everyone followed this selfish strategy, no one would contribute anything and no one would improve on their $20 stake. In experiments, people seem to grasp this, and contribute about half their stake. But after a while, people decrease their contribution, learning that selfishness pays.
Prof. Fehr and his colleagues then introduced a twist: They let players exact punishment. At the end of each round, if Player A thinks Player B has been freeloading, A can fine B, but only at a cost. If A wishes to fine B $1, say, A must also pay 30 cents to the person running the game.
From a purely selfish and even logical point of view, A would be an idiot to do this. A loses money and gains nothing tangible in return. Yet most players are eager to exact punishment anyway. In fact, they exact revenge even when they have no chance of reaping any rewards personally: Players are quite willing to engage in such altruistic punishment even if the game is arranged so that A never again plays in the same group as B and therefore has no chance of benefiting from more public-spirited behavior by a chastened B.
"The punishment pattern does not change," says Prof. Fehr. "It's astonishing. Even though B makes a larger public contribution in later rounds with other players, A never benefits from imposing the fine. People do not act simply to maximize their economic self-interest. They are ruled not only by cold economic logic but by emotion and a sense of fair play."
Lucky thing, too. Groups that include a number of altruistic punishers are better able to survive disasters such as war and famine. As a result, this strategy spreads, anthropologist Robert Boyd of the University of California, Los Angeles, reported in a paper earlier this year.
"Even when naturally selfish individuals are a majority, the presence of people willing to punish freeloaders can enforce social cooperation in much larger groups," says Prof. Fehr. Would-be freeloaders get the message that, if they fail to contribute to the common good, someone out there may nail them for it.
It isn't clear why some people are prone to playing avenging angel, but altruistic punishment seems to have deep neurological roots. A brain-imaging study led by Prof. Fehr this past summer found that people who have the highest activity in the cortex's reward circuit, which fires on all cylinders when we achieve something enjoyable, are also the most likely to punish freeloaders even at a high cost to themselves. Apparently, the economic cost is more than offset by the psychological reward: It feels good.
The Lord may sayeth that vengeance is His, but when it comes to keeping our fellow members of society in line, gleeful vengeance seems to be civilization's glue. [/quote]
Democrats Ascendant
(Text of a radio segment from Jeff Kropf's show on KXL today around 12:20 p.m.)
Jeff, I'm coming to you live from Democratic Party headquarters in downtown Portland.
Now that the session is over in Salem, Democrats are reveling in the series of stunning victories that they have won this year in Oregon.
Jeff, as you know, the Democrats nationally are a minority party, and that has left them unable to do much in Congress except obstruct. They're the party of no, nix, nothing, no way, nada, not happening, too bad. The national Democratic platform appear to have collapsed into nothing more than petty obstructionism, and a desire to figure out whatever it is President Bush wants to do, and stop it.
Sadly, the once proud party of JFK and FDR has degenerated into nothing more than a faint, negative echo.
And that is what makes the contrast with Oregon so stark. Here in Oregon, Democrats are the majority party -- they control the governorship, all the major statewide offices, the state Supreme Court, and the state Senate.
This has allowed Oregon Democrats to raise obstructionism to an entirely new level. On health-care reform Democrats brought us... nothing. On major reform for K-12 education: nothing. Economic development: nothing. PERS reform: nothing. The governor's outcome based budgeting approach: failed.
Nationwide, Democrats are looking to Oregon for a new model of how a political party can use their majority status to really make things... Not Happen.
<>
Jeff, that is so 2004. Maybe back when you were a kid, politics was about enacting policies, or instituting reform, or heck, even funding the schools. Not anymore.
The Democratic Party used to be a party of ideas -- in 1965. Face it just, the last a new idea to come from the Democrat was when Mike Dukakis rode around in a tank. They haven't gotten over that one.
And so, this year they've come up with a new, better approach. Instead of developing new ideas -- which is an enormous amount of work -- they're just going to criticize other people's ideas. Instead of coming up with a political agenda or a set of policies to pursue, they're going to wait for somebody else to do that... and then stop them.
<>
EXACTLY! That is the whole point, Jeff, is to embrace irresponsibility. It's the perfect Democratic strategy for the 21st-century. If your party is not responsible, then your party isn't at fault.
So the next question is, how will the Politics of Obstruction play out in the governor's race next year?
<>
Well, Jeff, the Democrats believe Kulongoski's ineffectiveness will give him a big advantage. Normally, a governor running for a second term has to run on his record. He has to explain to voters all the things he did during his first term. But Ted Kulongoski has brilliantly immunized himself from any such criticism. There is nothing for anybody to criticize, because Ted didn't do anything. His record is, that he has no record.
<>
It's easy. Ted positions himself as an outsider, ready to sweep in and clean up Salem. Because his party stands for irresponsibility, he himself is not responsible for anything that's happened. Ted will appeal to the angry voters who feel the government has failed to do its job.
<>
Jeff, why would the voters blame Ted Kulongoski for anything? It's not like he's been governor or anything. Jeff?
<>
Jeff, I'm coming to you live from Democratic Party headquarters in downtown Portland.
Now that the session is over in Salem, Democrats are reveling in the series of stunning victories that they have won this year in Oregon.
Jeff, as you know, the Democrats nationally are a minority party, and that has left them unable to do much in Congress except obstruct. They're the party of no, nix, nothing, no way, nada, not happening, too bad. The national Democratic platform appear to have collapsed into nothing more than petty obstructionism, and a desire to figure out whatever it is President Bush wants to do, and stop it.
Sadly, the once proud party of JFK and FDR has degenerated into nothing more than a faint, negative echo.
And that is what makes the contrast with Oregon so stark. Here in Oregon, Democrats are the majority party -- they control the governorship, all the major statewide offices, the state Supreme Court, and the state Senate.
This has allowed Oregon Democrats to raise obstructionism to an entirely new level. On health-care reform Democrats brought us... nothing. On major reform for K-12 education: nothing. Economic development: nothing. PERS reform: nothing. The governor's outcome based budgeting approach: failed.
Nationwide, Democrats are looking to Oregon for a new model of how a political party can use their majority status to really make things... Not Happen.
<>
Jeff, that is so 2004. Maybe back when you were a kid, politics was about enacting policies, or instituting reform, or heck, even funding the schools. Not anymore.
The Democratic Party used to be a party of ideas -- in 1965. Face it just, the last a new idea to come from the Democrat was when Mike Dukakis rode around in a tank. They haven't gotten over that one.
And so, this year they've come up with a new, better approach. Instead of developing new ideas -- which is an enormous amount of work -- they're just going to criticize other people's ideas. Instead of coming up with a political agenda or a set of policies to pursue, they're going to wait for somebody else to do that... and then stop them.
<>
EXACTLY! That is the whole point, Jeff, is to embrace irresponsibility. It's the perfect Democratic strategy for the 21st-century. If your party is not responsible, then your party isn't at fault.
So the next question is, how will the Politics of Obstruction play out in the governor's race next year?
<>
Well, Jeff, the Democrats believe Kulongoski's ineffectiveness will give him a big advantage. Normally, a governor running for a second term has to run on his record. He has to explain to voters all the things he did during his first term. But Ted Kulongoski has brilliantly immunized himself from any such criticism. There is nothing for anybody to criticize, because Ted didn't do anything. His record is, that he has no record.
<>
It's easy. Ted positions himself as an outsider, ready to sweep in and clean up Salem. Because his party stands for irresponsibility, he himself is not responsible for anything that's happened. Ted will appeal to the angry voters who feel the government has failed to do its job.
<>
Jeff, why would the voters blame Ted Kulongoski for anything?
<>
Saturday, August 06, 2005
Links to help Build an Economic Freedom Dashboard
There are a couple of good benchmarks of economic freedom. The best may be the Heritage/Wall Street Journal index:
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/
Another, run by Canada's Fraser Institute, uses somewhat different criteria:
http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html
And Freedom House (.org not .com) is here:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm
...though they are less narrowly focused on economic issues.
I hope that's a good start. And of course there's the classic site I like to refer everyone to when working on dashboards, the Balanced Scorecard Collaborative:
http://www.bscol.com/
And lastly, a new way of managing agencies that increases accountability and results, Charter Agencies:
http://charter.iowa.gov/01_ov_overview.html
I hope to help the OLCC (Oregon Liquor Control Commission) become the first Charter Agency in Oregon.
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/
Another, run by Canada's Fraser Institute, uses somewhat different criteria:
http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html
And Freedom House (.org not .com) is here:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm
...though they are less narrowly focused on economic issues.
I hope that's a good start. And of course there's the classic site I like to refer everyone to when working on dashboards, the Balanced Scorecard Collaborative:
http://www.bscol.com/
And lastly, a new way of managing agencies that increases accountability and results, Charter Agencies:
http://charter.iowa.gov/01_ov_overview.html
I hope to help the OLCC (Oregon Liquor Control Commission) become the first Charter Agency in Oregon.
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